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abstract: This article explores the transformation of the city of Dalian from a
colonial export port to an industrialized core city of the Japanese wartime empire
and finally a model production city of the People’s Republic of China. These shifts
in the economic and political function of the city also resulted in complex identity
issues forDalian’s urban residents.Dalian’s rise reminds that therewere trajectories
of urban development and modernity in China which were different from that of
Shanghai. Dalian provides an important, local view of the transition from empire
to nation in this strategically important part of Manchuria.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Northeast China, an area known as Manchuria,
was in the midst of an urban boom. Owen Lattimore, a leading scholar
and contemporary observer of the region, remarked that ‘Manchuria was
already more “megalopolitan” than any other part of China of equivalent
area, and farmoremetropolitan in ration of great cities to total population.’
The port city of Dalian, strategically located at the tip of the Liaodong
peninsula, was one such great city, and Lattimore considered it to be ‘far
ahead of Peking and Nanking’ in terms of modern urban development.1
Dalian was one of the first ‘instant cities’ in this region, growing from a
trading outpost in the late 1890s to a city of nearly 1 million people by
1945. By the early 1920s, the port of Dalian was second only to Hong Kong
and Shanghai in total trade volume, a spectacular rise to prominence.2
Dalian’s history is closely entwinedwith the rise and fall of the Japanese
empire, and the shifting map of political power inManchuria. The city sits
at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula, a sliver of land jutting into the Bohai
Sea. During the late 1890s, the peninsula became the focal point of Russian
and Japanese imperial designs for the military and economic control of
Manchuria. Out of this competition, Dalian was born. The city developed
along a historical trajectory shared with other urban colonial spaces in
China, including Hong Kong, Harbin and Changchun.3 It was planned
1 Owen Lattimore, Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict (New York, 1935), 260.
2 Y. Konishio, Port of Dairen (Dairen, 1923), 35.
3 For Harbin see James H. Carter, Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International
City 1916–1932 (Ithaca, 2002). For Changchun, see David Buck, ‘Railway city and national
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and built by Russia (1898–1904) and Japan (1905–45). From 1945 to 1950,
the Soviet Union (1945–50) occupied the city until control was formally
handed to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During their rule over
Manchuria, Japan built Dalian into a model city of its empire, and it was
hailed in the mid-1920s as ‘the monument and the measure of Japan’s
ability as a builder of modern cities’.4 By the early 1940s, the Japanese
population reached 225,000, making Dalian the most ‘Japanese’ city in
mainland China in terms of both population and political and economic
control.
With such a colonial past it is surprising that in 1949, just onemonth after
the founding of the People’s Republic and only four years since Japan’s
defeat, the Chinese press was hailing ‘NewDalian’ as ‘NewChina’s model
city’.5 The new Chinese communist state may have just as easily used
the city’s colonial past to cast Dalian in a much more negative light, as
a city tainted by decades of Japanese imperialism. Instead, readers are
presented with the fantastic tale of the rebirth of what is claimed to be
an undeniably Chinese city. Moreover, its status as a production model
placed it on the cutting edge of a new urban modernity. The People’s Daily
newspaperwrote of howDalian had been ‘transformed from an oppressed
Japanese imperialist colony, to an industrial base of New Democracy and
NewChina’.6 One commentator even proclaimed the city to be ‘a worker’s
paradise’.7
The image of cities instantly transformed from colonial hell to socialist
heaven was a common one used by the CCP as they moved from their
rural bases into a highly diverse urban landscape.8 After their takeover
of Shanghai in 1949, for example, the CCP described ‘New Shanghai’
in much the same way. Shanghai was, however, far from a model city
for the new regime. The CCP viewed that city’s capitalist, consumption-
oriented economy as a remnant of the imperialist past that would have to
be remade through revolution. Thus, behind the positive image of ‘new’
Shanghai, was a far more negative picture. There were even calls for the
city to be radically depopulated and returned to a status of ‘ordinary
regional centre’.9 The challenge for urban managers was to reorient places
like Shanghai from consumption cities to production cities, a process that
capital: two faces of the modern in Changchun’, in Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), Remaking the
Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu, 2000), 65–89.
4 Adachi Kinnosuke, Manchuria: A Survey (New York, 1925), 127.
5 Chen Qiying, ‘Dalian – xin Zhongguo de mofan dushi’ (Dalian – new China’s model
metropolis), Luxing zazhi (Travel Magazine), 23 (Nov. 1949), 2–8.
6 Dalian gongye zhanlanhui (ed.), Gongye Zhongguo de chuxing (The Embryonic State of
Industrial China) (Guangzhou, 1950), 7–10.
7 Li Zongying, Liu Shiwei and Liao Bingxion (eds.),Dongbei xing (Travels through the North-
East) (Hong Kong, 1950), 50.
8 See for example Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s analysis of the images of ‘New Shangai’ in idem,
Global Shanghai, 1850–2010: A History in Fragments (London, 2009), 77–88.
9 Marie-Claire Bergere, Shanghai: China’s Gateway to Modernity (Stanford, 2009), 342.
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would carry on well into the 1950s.10 Yet, in Dalian, this transformation
appears to have been completed in 1949.
In their proclamations about ‘New Dalian’, the CCP was staking
their claim to a city that had been a Japanese colony for 40 years and
controlled by the Soviet military for another five. This article argues that
to understand how the CCP was able to make such a claim about Dalian
one must look at the underexplored theme of the developmental legacies
of Japanese imperialism in the making of a new Chinese urban modernity.
The confident heralding of the city as a model hid a more complex reality
in which the new Chinese authorities rebuilt an urban, industrial order
which had many similarities with that of the previous regime.
Recent studies have begun to explore the continuities in state-building
efforts between those of the Nationalist government in the 1940s and the
CCP in the early 1950s. The war experience in the making of modern
China remains a central focus of this new work.11 However, the impact
and legacies of the Japanese wartime regime on the CCP’s post-war state-
building project remains underexplored. This article argues that while the
CCP’s politics spoke of liberation and social revolution, it was ultimately
the developmental foundations set by the Japanese wartime state which
came to empower the socialist definition of Dalian as a model production
city.
This article examines two interrelated features of the process of urban
redefinition in Dalian. First, it traces the fundamental shift in the city’s
economic function from that of an export and consumption economy to a
tightly controlled system of production. This transformation began in the
early 1930s and continued through the 1950s. It spanned multiple political
regimes which are usually treated as clean breaks in the narrative of
modern Chinese history, the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Soviet occupation
of the north-east and the founding of the PRC in 1949. War was central
to this transformation, and total war mobilization was a feature spanning
several decades of Dalian’s history. Secondly, it examines how, at key
points in Dalian’s short but dynamic history, serious questions arose about
the city’s identity and its place within larger frameworks of empire and
nation, and on these occasions, war brought some degree of clarity to
these concerns. It examines a key segment of the population, the industrial
labour force, to shed light on the common promises and assumptions
made by Dalian’s wartime leaders. It concludes that Dalian’s residents
had experienced a key form of urban modernity that would be labelled
‘socialist’ – the city as a production system – and which would become
more commonplace throughout China in the 1950s.
10 Liu Shaoqi (ed.), Xinminzhu zhuyi chengshi zhengce (New Democratic Urban Policy) (Hong
Kong, 1949), 22–8.
11 See Joshua H. Howard, Workers at War: Labor in China’s Arsenals, 1937–1953 (Stanford,
2004), and Rana Mitter and Aaron William Moore, ‘China in World War II, 1937–1945:
experience, memory, and legacy’, Modern Asian Studies, 45 (2011), 225–40.
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From colonial port to imperial production city
Throughout the late 1890s, Russia and Japan competed for a strategic
foothold in Manchuria. As a result of this sudden interest from imperial
powers, the tip of the Liaodong peninsula became a highly sought-
after spot on the map of Northeast Asia. It was in this highly charged
geopolitical context that the city of Dalianwas born. After defeating Russia
in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan inherited Russia’s colonial territory on
the Liaodong peninsula, which included the naval port town of Lu¨shun
and the blueprints for the magnificent but only partially constructed port
city of Dal’nii. Lu¨shun provided an important base for the projection of
naval power in the region, while Dal’nii was envisoned as a trading hub.
Japan renamed the city Dairen (Chinese: Dalian) in 1905, and set about
finishingRussia’s dreams for an international trading port, linked by rail to
the agricultural wealth of Manchuria, and by steamship to world markets.
As itwas anewcommunity, the colonial powers in control of theGuandong
Leased Territory had all of the barren shores of Dalian bay on which to
project their dream city.
Much like the instant boom cities in China today, Dalian’s growth was
fuelled by dreams of opportunity. Chinese and Japanese industrialists,
merchants, traders and labourers flocked to the new city. The population
grew from 19,000 in 1906 to over 200,000 in 1926.12 The port quickly
surpassed its regional rival at Yingkou to become the major export and
processing centre of Manchuria’s lucrative soybean trade.13 Steamships
run by Japanese firms carried soy products to Japan and as far away
as Europe, while Chinese merchants built a considerable coastal trading
network with Dalian at the centre. With an abundant source of cheap
Chinese labour from nearby Shandong, and long-distance railroad
connections from the deepwater port facilities to a fertile agricultural
hinterland, the sky seemed the limit for the economic future of the city.
Dalian was the terminus and headquarters of the South Manchurian
Railway Company (SMR), a massive, quasi-governmental entity that
oversaw the development of the railway and port facilities which brought
great wealth to the city. The company also systematically set out building
Dalian into amodel of Japanese colonial development inAsia. By the 1920s,
visitors marvelled at the city’s wide, tree-lined boulevards, grand central
plazas, parks, vibrant markets and modern shopping districts. Dalian’s
‘Great Plaza’ (O¯-hiroba) served as a symbol of its booming economic clout.
This central space was ringed with monumental commercial buildings,
including two major banks, and the grandiose Yamato Hotel, the finest
in the city. The SMR built schools, hospitals, libraries, port facilities and
established industrial enterprises in Dalian and the Leased Territory and
12 Inoue Kenzaburo (ed.), Dairen-shi shi (The History of the City of Dalian) (Dalian, 1936),
15–16.
13 Zhou Yonggang (ed.), Dalian gangshi (A History of the Port of Dalian) (Dalian, 1995), 170.
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the Railway Zone (fuzokuchi), a narrow strip of land controlled by the
company on both sides of the tracks stretching to Changchun.14 The SMR
hospital in Dalian was one of the largest modern facilities in China, with
room for 450 patients, and an outpatient clinic serving over 800 people per
day.15
With its modern transport infrastructure, commercial establishments
and cutting edge medical facilities, Dalian became the concrete
manifestation of Japan’s imperialist aims in Northeast Asia. As the
formal symbol of Japan’s informal empire inManchuria, Dalian’s Japanese
population was always very high, and hovered between one third and
one fourth of the total population of the city, reaching 225,000 by 1945.
Japanese dominated the most lucrative businesses and industries, earned
higherwages thanChinese andhadaccess to thebest schools andhospitals.
However, Chinese elites in this colonial city were far from powerless.
Chinese residents were the majority population throughout the city’s brief
history, and Dalian was home to a sizable Chinese merchant community,
with strong associational identities. By 1924, there were over 4,000 Chinese
businesses of various sizes throughout the city.16 The largest and most
profitable were bean mills, which processed soybeans into soybean oil for
export tomeet the increase indemand fromEurope and theUnited States.17
Many of the mill owners were members of the Shandong Native Place
Association, which served as a political and economic network for its elite
members, while providing charitable functions for migrant labourers.18
This even included nighttime Japanese language courses and technical
training. Dalian’s vibrant colonial economy had grown so quickly that by
the late 1920s there existed significant competition between Chinese and
Japanese merchants, and it was not uncommon for smaller Japanese firms
to lose business and even close due to Chinese competition.19
Yet, political events in the region soon took a drastic turn which would
radically alter Dalian’s role in the empire. On 18 September 1931, the
Japanese military garrisoned in Dalian and Lu¨shun invaded Manchuria
and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. Over the next few years
Dalian would lose its centrality as the political and economic capital of the
14 Manshikai (ed.), Manshu¯ kaihatsu yonju¯nenshi (Forty Year History of the Development of
Manchuria) (Tokyo, 1964–65), 224–6.
15 Kinnosuke, Manchuria: A Survey, 134–5.
16 Gu Mingyi, Fang Jun, Ma Lifeng, Wang Shengli, Zhang Qingshan and Lu Linxiu (eds.),
Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi (Collected History of the
Imperialist Invasion of Dalian: The Recent Hundred-Year History of Daliain) (Shenyang,
1999), 999.
17 Xu Jingzhi, ‘Jiefang qian Dalian minzu gongshangye jianwen’ (Information on pre-
liberationChinese industry and commerce inDalian),Dalianwenshi ziliao (DalianHistorical
Materials), 6 (1989), 87.
18 Dairen sho¯gakkai kenkyu¯ bu,Dairen chiho¯ ni okeru shinajin no shakai jigyo¯ (Social Enterprises
of Dalian’s Chinese Residents) (Dalian, 1930), 8–11.
19 Yanagisawa Asobu, Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin sho¯ko¯gyo¯sha norekishi
(The Japanese Colonial Experience: The History of Japanese Entrepreneurs in Dalian)
(Tokyo, 1999), 168–72.
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Japanese empire in Manchuria. The shift of human and material resources
toManchukuo, and the outbreak of totalwar inChina (1937) and thePacific
(1941) resulted in a fundamental reshaping of the city from a colonial
export port to a militarized production city. This transformation would
have lasting consequences for Dalian’s post-war fate.
Japan’s invasion of China in the mid-1930s, and the start of the Pacific
War in 1941, led civilian and military planners alike to prioritize key parts
of the empire as production bases in support of the expanding war effort.
Dalian became one such place. During this period, the city’s commercial
economy was increasingly controlled by the state, and reoriented toward
war production. This shift was evident in terms of urban space. Just as
the articles in this issue focusing on the Shanghai racecourse, Tianjin
waterworks and Suzhou’s red light district reveal how physical space
in the city is shaped by social and political networks, the case of Dalian
shows a transition away from commercial toward industrial spaces in
the context of total war. In the 1920s, the bustling docks and the banks,
hotels and business around the ‘Great Plaza’ were Dalian’s centre of
gravity, symbolizing the commercial power of the city. By the 1930s,
the symbolic centre shifted toward new suburban industrial zones and
imperial spaces like the new train station and the Guandong Leased
Territory administration complex.
In Manchukuo, Japan implemented a blueprint for building a modern
industrial base, designed to be a production centre serving the expanding
empire. This developmental scheme represents a significant break with
the patterns common to European imperialism, where the colony simply
provided food and raw materials to the metropole.20 Rather, Manchukuo
was a radical experiment, designed to be a self-sufficient part of the
empire, able to consume its own resources for industrial development and
feed the population with its agricultural goods.21 Larger companies from
Japan, including Nissan, moved to Manchukuo to form the Manchuria
Industrial Development Company (Mangyo¯). Mitsubishi and Mitsui also
invested heavily in chemicals and machine factories.22 This wave of state-
led industrialization continued through thewar years, influencingDalian’s
urban development well into the 1950s.
Before this, Dalian had never been a significant industrial or production
centre. The largest established industries were in SMR hands, namely the
SMR locomotive manufacturing and repair facilities. However, with the
prioritization of large-scale industrial development after 1932, the SMR
and other companies were encouraged to invest in new factories. As a
result, the number of factories employing five ormore employees inDalian
and the Guandong Leased Territory rose from 487 in 1932 to over 1,000
20 W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford, 1987), 213–17.
21 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism
(Berkeley, 1998), 241–306.
22 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, 213–17.
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by 1937.23 Moreover, the city’s industrial labour force increased 250 per
cent.24 Japan’s invasion of China in 1937, followed by the Pacific War
in 1941, pushed Dalian’s industrialization drive even further, and by 1943
therewere over 1,800 factories employing over 80,000 industrialworkers.25
The process of industrializing the colonial port city was not an easy
one. There were serious constraints to the development of large-scale
industrial enterprises in Dalian. The city lacked large expanses of flat land,
ready access to water demanded by industry and needed more electrical
power. In terms of the physical space for large industry, Dalian was at a
significant disadvantage compared to other cities developed by Japan in
Manchuria.26 The only available land suitable for industrial development
was to the north-west of the city. This area, called the Ganjingzi district,
became the focal point of industrialization. By 1935, Ganjingzi was home
to several major chemical plants, an oil refinery and steel processing and
machine tool factories. In the chemical sector, the Manchuria Chemical
Industry Company (Manshu¯ kagaku ko¯gyo¯ kabushiki kaisha), established
in 1933, was one of the largest in the region.27 The company built its
main factory in Ganjingzi, and produced ammonium nitrate for export as
chemical fertilizers to Japan, Taiwan and Korea. By the wartime period,
explosives were also manufactured here, in addition to sulphuric acid,
and ammonium-based chemicals and chemical products. Much of the
company’s equipment was purchased from German firms, and was the
most advanced equipment available. By the early 1940s, the company
employed 2,500 workers, with an additional 13,000 part-time labourers.
Chemical manufacturing was the most valuable of all of Dalian’s modern
industries, accounting for 40 per cent of the city’s production by value.28
The need for efficiency and productivity as demanded by the wartime
state led to the creation, in 1938, of an integrated development plan for the
whole of theLeasedTerritory.Dalianwas at the centre of these plans,which
were designed to maximize the area’s productive capacity, noting, ‘every
foot of land should be utilized and developed according to its adaptability
so as to materialize its mission fully’.29 It was an unprecedented effort to
co-ordinate industrial development in Dalian and its surroundings.
After 1941, with raw materials and power stretched thin across the
empire, maintaining high levels of production proved to be extremely
difficult. In order to keep production flowing, themilitary began to control
23 Dairen sho¯ko¯ kaigi (ed.),Kanto¯shu¯ no kogyo¯ jijo¯ (TheGuandongLeasedTerritory’s Industrial
Circumstances) (Dairen, 1939), 10–11.
24 Ramon Myers, The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932–1945 (New York,
1982), 127.
25 Lu¨da gaishu bianji weiyuan hui (ed.), Lu¨da gaishu (A Brief Account of Lu¨da) (Lu¨da, 1949),
64–6.
26 Dairen sho¯ko¯ kaigi (ed.), Kanto¯shu¯ no kogyo¯ jijo¯, 50–1.
27 Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi, 1089–90.
28 Ibid.
29 ‘A review of the thirty-year Japanese administration of the Kwantung leased territory and
the S.M.R. Zone’, Contemporary Manchuria, 3 (Jan. 1939), 78–9.
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completely all resources in Dalian, prioritizing the flow of necessary raw
materials, water, electricity and even food to critical industries. As early
as 1938, regulations had been in effect to ration electricity use in shops
and homes. Small industries and handicraft manufacturers, defined as
those with less than 50,000 yen in capital or under 20 employees, were
organized by industry and collectivized into groups of six.30 This was
part of the ‘rationalization’ (go¯rika) of production and trade. Energy and
resources were conserved by merging small-scale industries. As these
smaller industries were often privately owned, their reorganization set in
motion a lasting trend toward large-scale, state owned enterprises which
would become the central feature of the socialist production city in the
People’s Republic.
The expansion of the war in Asia and the Pacific had important
consequences for Dalian, as themilitary began to exert control over almost
all economic activities throughout the city. Beginning in April 1940, the
Japanese wartime state implemented trade restrictions on the import and
export of many commodities. A year later, the prices of commodities and
daily use goods were likewise strictly regulated.31 With these moves, the
traders and businesses which had helped to build Dalian into a model of
Japan’s colonial development through the 1920s were effectively sealed
off from their established trade networks as all available resources were
to be put toward the war effort. By 1942, most of the city’s independent
economic activity had been halted, and Dalian was fully integrated into
the centrally planned economies of Manchukuo and Japan through the
creation of the Manchukuo-Guandong Trading Association (ManKan bo¯eki
rengo¯kai), which was a centralized entity regulating the trade in daily
use commodities.32 Most importantly, it oversaw the organization of
Dalian’s remaining commercial enterprises and shops into collectivized
receiving and distribution fronts for the military’s rationing scheme. By
1943, most shops and businesses that traded in clothing, shoes, medicine,
all foodstuffs, tea and paper had been collectivized in this manner.33
The war experience in Dalian was thus different from other Chinese
cities. Therewas no brutal military occupation, massivemigration, civilian
massacre or bombing here. Instead, the people of Dalian, Chinese and
Japanese alike, experienced total warmobilization creep intomost features
of daily life. In the process, the Japanese wartime state had achieved
in Dalian what would become a key goal of CCP urban planning after
1949; it had transformed the city from a site of consumption into a tightly
controlled site of production in which the majority of its residents were
drawn into the process of producing for war. This experience also had
30 Lu¨da gaishu bianji weiyuan hui (ed.), Lu¨da gaishu, 12.
31 Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi, 960–1.
32 Kanto¯shu¯ keizaikai (ed.), Kanto¯shu¯ keizai nenpo¯ (Guandong Leased Territory Economic
Yearbook) (Dairen, 1944), 35–6.
33 Ibid.
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a profound impact on Dalian’s identity, both in terms of the position it
occupied in the wartime empire, and subsequently, on how city residents,
Chinese in particular, were viewed by the state.
Through 1932, Dalian served as the capital of the Guandong Leased
Territory, Japan’s formal colonial leasehold over the Liaodong peninsula.
The policies of Japan’s colonial administration here were somewhat
different from those in the formally annexed colonies like Taiwan or Korea,
particularly in terms of residency and the Chinese population’s position
within the larger empire. With the founding of Manchukuo, the situation
became even less clear, as it was not immediately apparent whether or not
Dalian was a part of this new nation. Considerable tensions existed among
the colonial powers over this issue. A notable Japanese author and resident
of Dalian, Saito¯ Mitshuhiro, wrote a provocative article in theDalian Shibao
newspaper, asking ‘who are the people residing abroad in Guandong’? He
continued, ‘now that Guandong is considered an extension of Japanese
territory, for those Han people living here, whether consciously or not,
we already consider them citizens of Manchukuo (Manzhouguoren)’.34
Saito¯ Mitshuhiro’s fears hinged on the administrative uncertainty of the
Guandong Leased Territory. He continued, ‘We should set up a principle of
putting Japanese first, otherwise, itwill be like it has been in the past,where
Han people are the original inhabitants and we Japanese are the people
residing abroad. In the Guandong Leased Territory we must establish a
system where we Japanese are the principal residents, and Han are the
visitors.’35
The outbreak of war brought clarity to these issues. Wartime
industrialization created new social hierarchies in the city. The biggest
change was a redefinition of categories of residency in the Guandong
Leased Territory which gave Chinese with permanent jobs, particularly
those with industrial jobs, higher status in the eyes of the wartime state.
Until the wartime period, there had been considerable confusion among
colonial bureaucrats in Dalian and the Leased Territory about how best
to classify the Chinese population. Much of this can be attributed to the
unique political status of theGuandongLeasedTerritory, particularly prior
to the founding ofManchukuo.Whilemany bureaucrats saw the extension
of Japanese laws in Guandong as beneficial, others wondered what it
would mean for the Chinese population. Were they to become subjects of
the Japanese empire like Taiwanese and Koreans? If not, were they to be
treated like ‘foreigners’ (gaikokujin)?36 Through the 1920s and 1930s, the
status of most of Dalian’s Chinese population was somewhere in between,
andoftendependedonone’s economic status.However, by the early 1940s,
34 Diguozhuyi qinlue Dalian shi congshu: Dalian jin bainian shi, 423. The quote is taken from a
1 May 1933 article in the journal Dairen Jipo¯.
35 Ibid.
36 Yamada Takeyoshi, Kanto¯shu¯ no shisei mondai (The Problem of City Administration in the
Guandong Leased Territory) (Dairen, 1928), 2–4.
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Japanese authorities established a more definitive registration policy for
the Guandong Leased Territory, which reflected the needs of the wartime
state to control and monitor effectively the working population.
The new registration laws of 1942 divided the Chinese population into
two categories. Those whose family registry was now in Guandong were
granted ‘registered’ (minseki) status. Everyone else, including those who
wanted to work in the city for more than 90 days with the hopes of
someday becoming a permanent resident, was considered a temporary
resident (kiryu¯ seki).37 To establish permanent residency, one had to have a
permanent home in the Leased Territory, usually by owning property or a
house. A stable job was also a factor. An individual hoping for this status
would present these qualifications to the neighbourhood or village leaders
to forward to the higher up authorities for approval. Once approved,
an entire family could gain status as registered residents of the Leased
Territory, with permission to work and move about far more freely than
others.38 They would then be issued a permanent resident card.39
Being a registered resident of the Leased Territory, a ‘Kanto¯shu¯ jin’,
allowed one’s children to attend better schools, and afforded opportunities
to try and attend Japanese-run schools, training institutes and colleges.
College for most Chinese in Dalian was not a possibility, only 6.5 per
cent of Chinese students attended colleges.40 Enterprising families from
Shandong who had yet to attain permanent status might be able to send
their children to school, but their path to success was much harder. Zhang
Lianmin was born in a shantytown area outside of Dalian. His family
was from Shandong, and lived in a community with others from their
home village. Zhang was lucky enough to attend a school nearby, and
recalls learning theharsh lessons of the colonial hierarchy,where Shandong
people were generally mistrusted by the authorities. Shandong children
who first started attending school had to learn not to refer to themselves
as Chinese.41
The most skilled Chinese workers, and those in prioritized industries,
were often locally born or with ‘registered’ status.42 Workers in the
37 ‘Kanto¯shu¯minseki kisoku’ (Regulations forGuandong Leased Territory residence), 11 Feb.
1942, reprinted in Nakamura Wataru (ed.), Kanto¯shu¯ soshakuchi to Minami Manshu¯ Tetsudo¯
fuzokuchi (TheGuandongLeased Territory and the SouthManchuria RailwayZone (Tokyo,
1966), 245–6.
38 Ibid.
39 ‘Aiguo de minzu gongshangyezhe – Xu Jingzhi’ (A patriotic industrialist – Xu Jingzhi) in
Dalian wenshiziliao (Dalian Cultural and Historical Material), 6 (Dec. 1989), 18.
40 Qi Hongshen (ed.), Dongbei difang jiaoyu shi (The History of Education in the North-East)
(Shenyang, 1991), 259.
41 Takenaka Kenichi, Dairen akashia no gakuso¯: sho¯gen shokuminchi kyo¯iku ni ko¯shite (Dalian’s
Schools of Acacia: True Records of Resistance to Colonial Education) (Tokyo, 2003), 80–7.
42 Kanto¯shu¯ ro¯mu kyo¯kai, ‘Kanto¯shu¯ ManShijin keiei ko¯jo¯ ro¯do¯ cho¯sasho’ (An investigation
of Chinese-managed factories in the Guandong Leased Territory) (Aug. 1940), in Shen Jie
andNagaokaMasami (eds.) Shokuminchi shakai jigyo¯ kankei shiryo¯shu¯ (Manshu¯,Manshu¯koku)
hen (Collected Materials on Colonial Social Enterprises in Manchuria and Manchukuo)
(Tokyo, 2005), vol. XI, 89–168.
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shipbuilding and machine tool manufacturing sector had comparatively
higher literacy rates. Industrial surveys from thewartimeperiodpraise this
highly skilledworkforce, noting that the educated, permanent labour force
found in Dalian was a key feature of its continued industrial growth, and
that locals were well suited for factory work due to a ‘higher cultural level
and an educational system in place for Chinese’.43 Thus, it was only under
increasingly severe wartime conditions the Japanese imperialist system
granted large numbers of Chinese a more privileged imperial status.
The new registration system was part of a significant attempt on
the part of wartime authorities to maintain Dalian’s labour force by
restricting the movement of people in and out of the city and between
jobs, restrict consumption and ensure that the best supply of food went to
the most critical war industries. This stands in contrast to occupied cities
like wartime Shanghai. Toby Lincoln’s article reveals, for example, how
the Shanghai authorities encouraged people to move out of the city. In
Dalian, the task of labour control was handled by the massive Guandong
LabourAssociationKanto¯shu¯ ro¯mu kyo¯kai, the state sanctioned unionwhich
oversaw everything from residence permits, housing distribution, job
appointments, policing theworkplace and running production campaigns
on the factory floor. This entity became one of the most important state
agency’s impacting the lives of Dalian’s industrial workforce, which by
the early 1940s was approaching 100,000 people.
The Labour Association played a very large role in enforcing restrictions
on themovement of people, and in co-ordinating immigration of labourers
intoDalian and the LeasedTerritory.Amajor goalwas to reduce drastically
andblock completely the exodus of labour fromDalian, particularly skilled
labour. It co-ordinated police efforts to investigate all outgoing passengers
at the entry points to the Leased Territory. Those individuals found fleeing
jobs or with technical skills were forbidden to exit, and were sent back to
Dalian.44
Within factories, the Labour Association oversaw the running of
competitions between work units, particularly in terms of increasing
production, and reducing absenteeism.45 It launched a major campaign,
the ‘perfect attendance movement’ (Ro¯muka kaikin jikko¯ undo¯), which was
part of a series of ‘factory prescriptions’ which the Labour Association
hoped to implement in order to achieve the goal of increasing production.
This included vague instructions to ‘rationalize’ the production process,
focusing on better utilization of raw materials and distribution of
resources. Discipline on the factory floor was also brought up, with
43 Dairen sho¯ko¯ kaigi (ed.), Dairen keizai benran (An Economic Handbook of Dalian) (Dairen,
1943), 51.
44 Han Yuexing, ‘Dalian de Guandongzhou loawu xiehui’ (Dalian’s Guandong Labour
Association), Dalian Chun Qiu (Annals of Dalian), 3 (1997), 24–5.
45 Kanto¯shu¯ keizaikai (ed.), Kanto¯shu¯ keizai nenpo¯, 61–5.
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high rates of worker absences, and serious time wasting noted as key
problems.46
As the Pacific War raged on through 1943, the need to safeguard the
production process in critical war industries in Dalian intensified. Strict
food rationing became a part of daily life for all city dwellers, and an
individual’s position in the wartime production system became vital. It
determined how much and what kind of food one could bring home. In
the late 1930s, Dalian’s major industries were divided into three ranks
which prioritized the flow of raw materials, energy and labour. By the
early 1940s, this system was also used for distributing food. There were
20 factories that received the top classification, a list which included such
heavy industries and manufacturing enterprises as shipbuilding factories,
chemical plants,machine tool factories, the locomotive factory and the port
authority. Those industries classified in the second rank included soybean
oil presses, transport and communications and public utilities. Third rank
industries included food processing and smaller chemical plants.47 In an
effort to ensure the labour supply in these critical industries, particularly
the top ranks, workers actually saw their food rations increased in 1943.48
Workers at the prioritized industrial units, Chinese and Japanese alike,
enjoyed larger rations than those in other sectors of the economy. At top
tier industries, Japanese workers received close to 29 jin (14.5 kilograms)
and Chinese 23 jin (11.5 kilogrammes), a figure equal to the amount given
to Japanese civilians in the city.49
The pressing demand for productivity in a state of total war led the
Japanese wartime state in Dalian to privilege a key segment of the colonial
population. The new residency system rewarded the skilled sector of the
Chinese working population with better access to education, housing and
food. At the same time that it extended these privileges, the state also
enforced restrictions on people’s movement, consumption patterns and
work lifewhichdeepenedpeople’sdependencyon theirworkunits and the
state. The echoes of this experience would be clear to those living through
the system of urban socialism idealized and implemented in the 1950s
and centred on the Soviet model, with its cellular work units, production
campaigns and the prioritization of resources towards strategic heavy
industries.
The powers that took over the city after 1945 gained control of an
industrialized port city with the majority of its key industries in state
hands. The largest of the former Japanese industries were immediately
46 Ibid., 56–61.
47 ‘Ju¯yo¯ sangyo¯ ni ju¯jisuru Manjin ro¯do¯sha shokuryo¯ haikyu¯ yo¯ko¯’ (An outline of food
distribution to Chinese labourers in major industries), in Manshu¯koku kimitsu keizai shiryo¯
(Secret Economic Materials of Manchukuo) (Tokyo, 2000–01), vol. XV, 30–41.
48 Dalian shizhi bangongshi (ed.),Dalian shizhi laodong zhi (Dalian Labour Gazetteer) (Dalian,
1999), 21.
49 Liu Gongcheng,Dalian gongren yundong shi (AHistory of the LabourMovement in Dalian)
(Shenyang, 1989), 271.
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seized by Soviet troops who arrived in Dalian in late August 1945 after
sweeping through Manchuria. In terms of the CCP’s image of what ‘new’
cities would look like in China after 1949, it is clear that Dalian was indeed
a model, and its economy had the numbers to back up its image as a
model production city, particularly when compared to Shanghai. As late
as 1952, the private sector in Shanghai was still responsible for 87 per cent
of that city’s industrial production.50 That same year modern industrial
production accounted for 96 per cent of the total industrial output of
Dalian, and, in stark contrast to Shanghai, 86 per cent of its industries
were state owned.51 Thus, by 1949, when the Chinese press hailed Dalian
as a model production city for the new nation, it was by far the most ‘state
owned’ of any other major city in China.
From Japan’s imperial city to New China’s model metropolis
Japan’s defeat in 1945 brought both joy and uncertainty for Dalian’s
Chinese residents. The city was free from decades of Japanese control, but
celebrations quickly turned to uncertainty as there were serious questions
about how Dalian would continue to function, and who would be in
control of the city. Within the first year of its post-Japanese existence,
the port all but shut down, and the city’s lifeline of raw materials and
food ceased to flow. At the peak of war production in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, the port handled over 10 million tons of goods annually, yet
by 1946 and 1947, that figure had decreased dramatically to a few hundred
thousand tons.52 The city’s vital war industries ground to a halt, and the
population decreased dramatically. Skilled workers who remained in the
city joined the swelling numbers of street hawkers and peddlers, where
they competedwith destitute Japanese families selling off their belongings
for food.53 Dalian’s large Japanese civilian population was repatriated in
1947, and many Chinese fled to rural areas or returned ‘home’ to nearby
Shandong province.
Both the Nationalists and the CCP hoped and planned to seize the
opportunity to liberate the city and gain control of its vital industrial
base and port facilities. However, both Chinese powers were denied the
chance to accept Japan’s surrender. Rather, on 22 August, Soviet tanks
and paratroopers arrived on Dalian’s streets. Unknown to most people in
the city at the time, the Soviets were there to stay. The Yalta Agreement,
and the subsequent Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed in February
1945 with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, granted the Soviets
control of the former Guandong Leased Territory for use as a naval base.
50 Bergere, Shanghai: China’s Gateway to Modernity, 354.
51 Lu¨da zhilu¨e bianxie xiaozu (ed.), Lu¨da zhilu¨e (A Brief Record of Lu¨da) (Shenyang 1960), 89.
52 Liu Liangang, Du Yunxiao, Shi Jiewen, and Gao Chongtai (eds.), Dalian gangkou jishi
(A Chronological History of the Port of Dalian) (Dalian, 1988).
53 Zhang Pei, Dalian fangwen jiyao (Summary of a Visit to Dalian) (Shenyang, 1949), 6–7.
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Dalian would remain a part of the Soviet-controlled Port Arthur (Lu¨shun)
Naval Base Area until 1950, at which time it was formally handed over to
the People’s Republic of China. Soviet military forces retained control of
the nearby Lu¨shun naval port until 1955.54
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, which had signed the treaty
with the Soviet Union, expected that their personnel would be allowed
into the city. After repeated denials to land troops and station officials
in the city, the Nationalist government effectively mobilized a brief but
symbolically powerful anti-Soviet student movement in Dalian to protest
Soviet occupation. While these activities were quickly contained in Dalian
itself, their message was carried throughout the nation via press reports
and books published in Shanghai and Nanjing which put the city on the
Nationalists’ map as a pivotal battle ground against communism and ‘red
imperialism’.55 Recovery of Dalian thus became essential for the health
of China as a whole. One Nationalist government-sanctioned book on the
situation in the city, published in 1947, urged its readers ‘to pay great
attention to Dalian, it is an issue of our nations survival, if we cave easily
to Soviet demands, we are committing suicide’.56
During these years, Dalianwas in geopolitical limbo; a Soviet-controlled
base that occupied a position on the post-war map of Northeast Asia
somewhere between the collapsed Japanese empire and the new Chinese
nation. Although the Soviets eventually allowed Chinese communists into
the city in large numbers, they too experienced significant frustration as
they attempted to stake deep, nationalistic claims to Dalian. As a ‘new’
city with just over 50 years of history in 1949, all of it dominated by
foreign powers, it was difficult for the CCP to assume that Dalian would
fit neatly into the geo-body of the new People’s Republic of China. Soviet
behaviour in the initial months after the takeover certainly did not help
matters, as the city’s liberators acted more like hostile occupiers. Rape and
looting on the part of Soviet troops was widespread, and both Chinese
and Japanese communities suffered. As they did throughout Manchuria,
the Soviets removed key industrial equipment and power generators from
Dalian. Armed conflicts betweenCCP and Soviet troops, either in response
to assaults on civilians or the looting of industries, were not uncommon
occurrences.57
These were serious issues. Since Japan’s defeat, the Liaodong peninsula
had become a heavily militarized area, with over 100,000 Soviet troops
stationed there. This, along with the CCP and the Nationalist militaries
clamouring to land their troops in the city, made Dalian a potential
54 Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the
Alliance (Armonk, 2004), 51–125, 348, 415.
55 Ibid., 49, 54.
56 Li Chongsheng (ed.), Lu¨da de Jinxi (Lu¨da’s Present and Past) (Nanjing, 1947), 83.
57 Christian A. Hess, ‘Big Brother is watching: local Sino-Soviet relations and the building
of New Dalian, 1945–1955’, in Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (eds.), Dilemmas of
Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China (Harvard, 2007), 160–83.
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‘hot’ zone in the emerging Cold War, and the Soviets were fearful of US
intervention should fighting over the city escalate. In this highly charged
environment, the Soviets believed that any kind of unrest, including the
revolutionary activities orchestratedby theCCP,was toodangerous. Soviet
troops routinely stopped CCP cadres from carrying out struggle sessions
against Japanese collaborators and forced any grassroots campaigns and
activities to take place through Soviet-sanctioned ‘Sino-Soviet Friendship
Associations’.58
Just as they tried to mobilize political support by appealing to Chinese
nationalism, the CCP were forced to accept a complex arrangement which
left them second in command to another foreign occupying power. For the
ruralCCPcadreswhoarrived inDalian fresh fromaprolongedguerillawar
against Japan, thiswas a bitter reality. Theirmost potent tool formobilizing
the population was to rebuild ‘new’ society through struggle against the
old. Dalian, in their eyes, was full of people who had collaborated with
the Japanese, and also full of people who had suffered under Japanese
rule. The plan was to try and empower the latter group to struggle against
the former. The Soviet’s refusal to allow the CCP to build support in
this way was more than an operational headache; it blocked their deeper,
nationalistic claims to legitimacy in the eyes of Dalian’s Chinese residents.
Open conflict between the CCP and Soviets over the control of the city,
its key industries and its labour force reached a boiling point in 1947. That
year, leading CCP cadres in Dalian began openly to resist Soviet military
policies. The most serious conflicts were economic in nature. Shortly after
they arrived in the city, the Soviets took control of the major Japanese
industries throughout the city. The CCP, under Soviet oversight, formed
a city-wide labour union, and its members soon angrily complained to
labour leaders that the wage structure in those factories was different
from that in Chinese-held industries. Wages in Chinese industries were far
higher than in the Soviet managed facilities. Tang Yunchao, the leader of
the labour union, was outraged and in union meetings openly referred to
the Soviet Union as ‘an imperialist country’.59
Just as the fragile political order was sliding toward chaos, war once
again brought clarity to Dalian in terms of its political status, economic
function and its identity. The Chinese civil war between the Nationalists
andCCP,which lasted from late 1945 through 1950, led the city to be cast in
an important and familiar light. Politically, as the civil war intensified, the
Soviets began to throw their support behind the CCP. The CCP likewise
began pursuing a policy of following Soviet guidance, referred to locally
as ‘putting the Soviets first’, and backed away from their stronger claims
58 Wang Qiren, ‘Chuli yu Su jun dangju guanxi de ji ge yuanze’ (Some principles on dealing
with the Soviet military authorities), in Dalian shi shizhi bangongshi (ed.), Sulian hongjun
zai Lu¨da (The Soviet Red Army in Lu¨da) (Dalian, 1995), 105.
59 ‘Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, 17 Sep. 1947’ (A summary of the talks between ‘Ba
Shen’ and Du Ping on 17 Sept. 1947), in Sulian hongjun zai Lu¨da, 279–80.
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to Dalian, reluctantly accepting Soviet authority. Dalianwas now heralded
as the cutting edge of ‘the Soviet model’ – the embrace of Soviet guidance,
expertise and culture which would spread to all of China through the
1950s. As a result, local tensions between the two eased, and both sides
turned their attention to reindustrializing the city. Although many of its
industries were non-operational, and there were few resources and raw
materials in the Soviet-controlled base area, the city nevertheless had the
potential to be a crucial production base for CCP’s war effort. The former
Japanese industrial base, and most importantly, its workers, would prove
vital to this plan, as Dalian’s war industries were once again privileged by
the new regime to jumpstart the economy.
The ‘Soviet model’ became the vehicle for this renewal, and it placed
great emphasis on heavy industries as the leading sector of economic
development. The Soviets had seized and controlled the largest of the
former Japanese war industries, including the locomotive plant and
shipbuilding facilities and these became model Sino-Soviet managed
industries, and employed one third of Dalian’s labour force.60 The CCP
inherited smaller factories, including chemical production facilities which
had the potential to be vital in terms of manufacturing armaments for
their war effort against the Nationalists. The Soviet model offered ways to
reorganize theworkplace based on production teams, labour competitions
and a tiered wage structure which privileged those with advanced skills
or managerial experience.
Under this system, political elites also began to view the population in
much the same way as during the Japanese war regime. The CCP’s anti-
Japanese nationalism, which had earlier led them to question people’s past
positions within the Japanese system, was downplayed in favour of the
pressing needs to reindustrialize. People in Dalian were thus evaluated by
the newauthorities in terms of their positionwithin the production system.
The CCP began paying significant attention, both in terms of propaganda
and policy, to dealing with ‘non-productive’ people throughout Dalian. In
1946, the Soviet-CCP authorities estimated that over 80,000 people were
peddling goods of all kinds on the streets and in large open markets
throughout the city. This activity was considered non-productive, and
beginning in 1947, market crackdowns and re-employment campaigns
funnelled people of key working age off the street and into industries.61
This was combined with the issuance of a new currency at a rate which
decimated the savings of any family that had managed to build up a
savings, thereby both reducing consumption and forcing people towork.62
Moreover, the CCP’s own labour union began to act less as a voice
for worker welfare, which had led to conflicts with the Soviets, and
more as an agent of the new production regime. This state institution
60 Dalian shizhi bangongshi (ed.), Dalian shizhi laodong zhi, 77.
61 Zhang, Dalian fangwen jiyao, 6–8.
62 Ibid., 8–9.
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began to enforce residency requirements, issued identification cards based
on employment and employability and oversaw the running of labour
competitions and other disciplinary actions designed to maximize output
during the working day. Just as in the Japanese era, the new police force in
Dalianused labour registration cards to restrictmovement of skilled labour
out of the city.63 Many workers would have been familiar with Japan’s
Labour Association and with the very similar activities it sponsored only
a few years before. The Japanese system lingered in other ways as well.
During exhausting labour competitions, the main target to achieve was to
surpass the levels of production of 1943, the year that Dalian’s productive
capacity reached its peak.64
The Soviet model as implemented in Dalian resonated with the past
in other ways. This was a state once again at war, and workers were
asked to work more for less. By 1947, the lower wage scale that had been
implemented in Soviet-controlled industries became standard. At 16 jin of
grain per month, this was lower than during the Japanese era.65 Moreover,
the Sovietmodel involved a tieredwage structure inwhich themost skilled
workers earned the highest wage. Often the most skilled were precisely
those workers educated under the Japanese. During the late 1930s and
early 1940s, Japanese publications praised Dalian’s Chinese workforce,
noting that the educated, permanent labour found in the city was a key
feature of its continued industrial growth, and that locals were well suited
for factory work due to a ‘higher cultural level and an educational system
in place for Chinese’.66 This group was politically suspect by the CCP, but
ultimately rewarded for their expertise given the pressing needs of the
time. This would be a very significant tension in the labour force for years
to come.
Speaking to his workers in 1947 at the outset of the embrace of the
Soviet model and the renewed push for wartime industrialization, the
union leader, Tang Yunchao, played on this tension in his speech. He
told the assembled workers, ‘The people of Dalian did not have to go
through the fight that Chinese in liberated areas continued to go through
in order to achieve the fruits of victory, which were dropped on them by
the Soviet military.’ He importantly stopped short of discussing people’s
life under the Japanese – that would come later in the mass campaigns of
the 1950s. In the meantime, the way to redemption, both in terms of one’s
immediate economic situation and in terms of uniting through struggle
with the rest of CCP-held China, was through production. Tang continued
his speech by carefully contextualizing labour during the Japanese period:
‘Weworkers fromDalian have been forged in amould of modern industry
63 Lu¨da gaishu bianji weiyuan hui (ed.), Lu¨da gaishu, 347–8.
64 Lu¨da xingzheng gongshu, ‘Guanyu 1949 nian jingjianjihua de jiben zongjie yu 1950 nian
jingjian renwu’ (An outline of economic construction plans from 1949 and our tasks for
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65 ‘Ba Shen yu Du Ping tanhua jiyao, 17 Sep. 1947’, 279–80.
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for 40 years, and we have much firsthand experience with production
and endless stamina. Given the present difficulties, we must use all of our
experience and effort to increase production and for it is through this effort
that we carve a path for ourselves.’67 What made these people and their
city valuable to new China, what made them Chinese at this moment, was
their position in a system of war production that spanned Japanese, Soviet
and Chinese regimes.
Conclusion
What can Dalian tell us about urban development and urbanmodernity in
China? Its historymaybeunique amongmajorChinese cities, but the forces
whichbuilt it, colonialism, imperialismand totalwar,were not. To return to
the images of ‘NewDalian’ presented in 1949, the citywas in fact amodel of
a new kind of urban form, the production city. It was certainlymuch closer
to that ideal thanChina’s othermajor cities, including Shanghai. In the field
of Chinese urban history, Shanghai has proven to be a very important site
throughwhich to explore themesof cosmopolitanismand thedevelopment
of the private sector, andmany fine studies now exist which illuminate the
kinds of hybridity that a city of that size, with its mix of foreign and
Chinese, came to represent in terms of a distinctive Chinese modernity.
Dalianwas no lessmodern during the period examined in this article, but it
was on a very different trajectory from Shanghai. It was not pummelled by
war and imperialismbutwas built in this context.Moreover, this article has
argued that the legacies of the Japanese wartime regime proved vital in the
reformulation of Dalian after 1949. Thus, in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
the CCP not only built upon developmental legacies from the Nationalist
government and Soviet Union in formulating their plans for a new China,
but from Japanese foundations aswell.With unusual openness, a journalist
who wrote for a major daily newspaper made this point clear to readers
in an article on Dalian’s rebirth. He described how Dalian’s model status
came to be, concluding, ‘For this we need to thank the system of Japanese
imperialist monopoly, for it gave Dalian the conditions necessary for
building socialism.’68 There was little use hiding the fact that China’s new
model city owed a great deal to its Japanese past.
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